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BANKS AND BANKING-MERGER-LIABILITIES-ESTOPPEL-TAX-

ATION--Crosby, etc. vs. First National Bank of Holyoke-No.
14175-Decided February 14, 1938-District Court of Phillips
County-Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
First National Bank of Holyoke took over business and
assets of Citizens State Bank of same city as a result of negotiations
between the two banks between 1930 and May 29th, 1931. In complying with the State Statute concerning voluntary liquidation of state
banks, both banks submitted statements to the Bank Commissioner
stating that the assets of the latter bank had been transferred to the
former which assumed all liability of record under date of transfer of
assets, etc. A bond was also furnished the Commissioner to protect
the creditors of the Citizens Bank. The County Treasurer brought
suit against the First National Bank to collect $1,526.38, being the tax
on the capital stock of the Citizens Bank for 193 1. It was contended
by the defendant that its contract did not provide that it was to pay
such an item. The plaintiff contended that the bank was estopped
to raise such a question. The trial court ignored the question of estoppel and held for defendant.
HELD:
1. Where two banks effect a merger and each notifies
the State Banking Commissioner of the transfer of the assets of one
to the other, and a bond is deposited to insure the payment of all debts
of the former, but refers to a contract between the banks which omit
reference to the capital stock tax, the remaining bank is estopped to
deny its liability for such tax where the terms of such contract are not
conveyed to the commissioner.
2. The rule that "where there is no evidence that any of the
representations were made to the treasurer personally, to his prejudice, he
may not rely on the principle of estoppel" does not apply here. Where
the representation is so general in its terms, or made under such circumstances, as to indicate that it was intended to reach and influence third
persons or the community at large, the doctrine of estoppel is carried
sufficiently far to protect everyone who has innocently acted upon or
been governed by it.
3. The capital stock was subject to the tax for 1931 on the
basis of its value as of April 1, 1931, and it is immaterial that at the
time of the transaction, the amount of the tax had not been ascertained.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young concur.
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POLLUTION OF INJUNCTION MINING The Slide
Mines, Inc. vs. The Left Hand Ditch Company et al.-Decided
February 21, 1938-District Court of Boulder County-Hon.
Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Affirmed.

WATER

FACTS:
Defendant in error shall be referred to as the farmers
and the plaintiff in error as the mining company. At the suit of the
farmers, as appropriators for irrigation and domestic purposes, the
mining company was permanently enjoined from polluting the waters
with mill tailings and slimes developed in its milling operations.
HELD:
1. Where actionable pollution is found to exist at the
time suit is filed and thereafter continued, an injunction properly cannot be denied because of arrangements which promise no future transgression but do not so insure.
2.
If the system devised by the mining company to prevent the
pollution of the stream by its mill tailings is not effectual in preventing
such defined pollution in fact, the pollution may be enjoined.
3.
Pollution is an impairment, with attendant injury, to the
use of the water that plaintiffs are entitled to make.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Young concur.
Mr. Justice Bouck specially concurs.

TAX SALES--CERTIFICATES-REDEMPTION-Roley vs. Creel et al.No. 14101-Decided January 31, 1938-District Court of
Pueblo County-Hon. John H. Voorhees, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit by Roley, fee holder of real estate, to enjoin County
Treasurer from issuing tax deed. Property sold for 1930 taxes and
certificate of purchase issued to County. Like defaults occurred in
1931, 1932 and 1933.
These were endorsed on the certificate of
purchase, making the total due thereon, $2,000.00.
The 1934 taxes
were also unpaid.
The County Commissioners resolved on December
23, 1935, to sell the certificate for $670.86, provided, the purchaser
would also pay the 1934 taxes, or a total of $1,000.00.
M paid
that sum and received an assignment of the tax certificate.
Plaintiff
contended Section 1, Chapter 217, S. L. 1935 (1935 C. S. A., Chapter 142, Section 209) precluded the County Commissioners from making sale of the tax certificate in question before December 31, 1935,
until when, as said, the fee owner of the property was privileged to
pay the taxes on his property, delinquent August 1, 1934, with abatement of interest and penalties.
Plaintiff did not attempt to pay the
taxes as provided by statute, but supplied his representative with
$1010.00, who on the day the transaction with M was closed, but subsequent thereto, offered $1010.00 for the certificate.
The offer was
rejected because of the prior sale. The plaintiff then instituted this
suit and paid into Court $1005.00 for M's use.
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HELD: 1. The sum which the redeemer was bound to pay was
considerably in excess of the amount tendered. The law does not provide that an owner may make purchase of outstanding tax certificates
against his property. He can be relieved from tax defaults only by
paying the sum required by law, mathematically ascertained, to the
County Treasurer.
2. The owner had only his right to redeem, and this was open to
him and was not impaired by the sale which the County Commissioners made of the tax certificate against his property. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
INSURANCE-DOUBLE

INDEMNITY-New York Life Insurance Com-

pany vs. Matiano-No. 14273-Decided January 31, 1938District Court of Las Animas County-Hon. David M. Ralston,
Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where policy of insurance providing double indemnity for accidental death, contains a provision as follows:
"Double indemnity shall not be payable if insured's death resulted
* * * from any bacterial infection other than bacterial infection occurring in consequence of accidental and external bodily injury,"
double indemnity may not be recovered where death results from
botulism contracted through eating home canned beans containing
"bacillus botulinus." EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-RECREATION-ACCIDENTS--Industrial Commission of Colorado, State
Compensation Insurance Fund, and Minnesota Mines, Inc. vs.
Jerry J. Murphy-Decided February 14, 1938-District Court
of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
The sole question is whether the injury complained of
by Murphy arose out of and in the course of his employment by the
Minnesota Mines, Inc.
Upon suggestion by an employee of the company that a baseball
team, to play on Sundays, be organized, the company, by one of its
officers, offered to "match dollar for dollar" the expense of the organization. The team was known by the company name, but no one was
obliged to play or attend the games, and no man was ever employed
or discharged because of baseball only. Six of the players were employees of the company. Players usually furnished their own transThe team went to Colorado Springs to play, Murphy takportation.
ing three men in an automobile belonging to the company which he
borrowed for that purpose. On the return trip the Murphy car col-
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lided with another in Vernon Canon and Murphy was permanently
injured. District Court allowed the claim.
1. Allowance of this claim could but serve as a warnHELD:
ing to employers that they may concern themselves with the social life
and recreation of their men, or permit their officers to do so or contribute to efforts to lighten life, only under penalty or liability for
every accident and injury arising from such activities, however remote
from the employment itself. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
VAGRANCY-GAMBLING-POLICE

COURTS-BURDEN

OF PROOF-

ORDINANCES-EVIDENCE-Handler vs. City and County of
Denver-No. 14249-Decided February 14, 1938-County
Court of Denver-Hon. Osmer E. Smith, Judge-Affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
FACTS: Defendant convicted in Police Court on charges of vagrancy and gambling. He appealed to County Court where he was
acquitted of the gambling charge, but convicted of vagrancy, fined
$100.00 and sentenced to the County Jail for 30 days.
1. Where the original process under which the defendHELD:
ant was arrested and convicted in Police Court recited sections 1345
and 1346 of the Municipal Code, charging defendant with vagrancy
such is a sufficient allegation of violation of the ordinance.
2. One who leads an idle, immoral or profligate course of life,
is guilty of vagrancy, under section 1345 of the 1927 Municipal Code.
3. Where a party litigant introduces into evidence the 1927
Municipal Code, such book of ordinances shall be taken and considered
as prima facie evidence that such ordinances have been published as
provided by law, and the burden of proof is on the other party to
prove that the ordinance has been changed, and such proof requires
more than merely casting a doubt or suspicion upon the validity of the
ordinance.
4. A sentence of both a fine of $100.00 and thirty days in jail
is not allowed under the ordinance. The provisions of the ordinance
as to the sentence and fine are separable and distinct, and therefore,
the judgment as to the fine stands.
5.
Violation of municipal ordinances, being civil in their nature,
does not require the strict proof of criminal prosecutions.
6. Where a preponderance of the evidence indicated defendant
was guilty of vagrancy; that he had no visible means of support other
than those which he had received from the course he had been pursuing
over a long period of time; that he had been found guilty of gambling
and vagrancy on previous charges no less than five times, the trial Court
was correct in its finding of vagrancy under the ordinance.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.

